Abstract: Risk-taking behaviours in mining production is one of the unsafety behaviours impacting the safety status of mine enterprises more seriously. In order to study the occurring causes of the risk-taking behaviours and their corresponding control strategy,an evolutionary game model of workers and safety regulators was constructed,and the game process was analyzed by system dynamics method. The results show that:① The costs and benefits of workers′ safety behavior and safety regulator′ s supervision behavior are the major causes affecting the occurrence of "risk-taking behaviours" in mines;② The intensity of mine supervision affects the probability of workers′ unsafe behavior,and the intensity of mine supervision is positively correlated with the safety probability of worker behavior within a certain range;③ Increasing the economic punishment of safety regulators on unstable workers and increasing the risk cost borne by unstable workers can improve the safety production of enterprises in a short period of time;④ The benefits of workers in the behavioral safety state have the greatest impact on the regulatory behavior of workers′ behavioral safety and safety regulators. Enterprises can formulate corresponding safety control strategies according to the dynamic game evolution process and the influence degree of model parameters.

Key words: risk-taking behaviours in production,evolutionary game model,system dynamics,safety control strategy